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The construct of the book is cogent.
Vlahos outlines his rationale for the
project before he delves into theory and
definitions. He turns to methodology
and research, offering guidelines for future scholarship. His content chapters,
“Them,” “Us,” and “Fit,” represent the
substance of the book, encompassing
his analysis on the development of
identity through war. Vlahos’s argument centers on the idea that the interactive nature of warfare creates, and
changes, identity.

American social construct. Vlahos provides an analysis of inestimable value
based on an impressive grasp of history
and philosophy. Written primarily for
scholars, Fighting Identity is a modern
philosophical treatise on war’s influence on the development and evolution
of sacred identity. While I recommend
this book for a wide audience, the subtleties of its analysis and the structure of
its argument are complex and elaborate.
This book is easily read but not easily
understood.

In his view, war is a “sacred ritual” that
has been practiced throughout history
and that in turn shapes social identity.
These rituals have semireligious undertones and come to represent “humanity’s dark liturgy.” Further, war and
interactive conflict shape the identities
of participants, cultivating cohesion,
motivation, and awareness. Vlahos argues that interaction creates common
narratives and also leads to an acquisition of legitimacy. Finally, interactive
conflict emerges as a central component
of social identity (both national and
nonstate), which shapes historical hindsight as well as future policy decisions.

S. MIKE PAVELEC

This book draws on Vlahos’s extensive
knowledge of history. He flows from
the ancient to the contemporary with
ease, drawing on past and present examples to support his arguments. In the
final chapter, “Where I Come Out,” he
argues that the United States is facing a
crisis of identity in its own sacred narrative, as it transitions from the Cold
War to something new. Finally, he suggests that the social identity of the nation will evolve as it faces the challenges
of the twenty-first century.
Overall, this is an exceptional work of
scholarship on the creation of social
identity, as well as a critique of
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The Cold War was a real war, marked
by complexity. The nation-states making up the international system (the
United States, the United Kingdom,
and the Soviet Union) that emerged in
the wake of the atomic age were compelled to avoid a general conflict and to
protect civilization from nuclear extinction. As such, a variety of instruments
were utilized by these great powers.
One of those instruments was the collection and analysis of intelligence and,
in particular, nuclear intelligence.
The fact is, Goodman, a lecturer in the
Department of War Studies at King’s
College London, states, that “intelligence was in some ways the cold war
waged by other means.” A little known
aspect of the Cold War involved the
Anglo-American intelligence communities’ intense focus on the development
of Soviet nuclear weapons. Goodman’s
main contention is that despite the
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strictures of the American Atomic Energy Act of 1946 (the McMahon Act),
which forbade the transfer of American
scientific and technological knowledge
of the atomic weapon to any other
power, Anglo-American nuclear intelligence cooperation nevertheless went
ahead. These two governments used
this intelligence to predict outcomes,
and what proved to be even more successful, the detection of Soviet nuclear
weapons testing.
Goodman’s narrative of this effort focuses on long-distance monitoring, as
well as acoustic, seismographic, and
electromagnetic monitoring of the Soviets’ nuclear weapons program. This is,
in itself, an excellent insight into the
Cold War nuclear intelligence from
1945 to 1958, an invaluable mirror into
these efforts.
What sets this work apart, however, is
Goodman’s placement of what is essentially one mirror behind another—his
revelation of the strategic implications
of nuclear intelligence-sharing on the
Anglo-American special relationship itself, along with the impact of that relationship on the Soviet Union. To
understand the dynamics involved,
Lewis Carroll’s Through the Looking
Glass is worth recalling, as Alice declares that it is like a huge game of chess
that is being played all over the world.
But what of the Soviet Union, the conventionally understood object of all the
covert intelligence monitoring and detection efforts? Goodman answers this
question in his conclusion. He argues
that while extensive literature exists on
the Soviet threat and the American perception of it, these works often deal
with what he calls an alleged “bomber
gap” and “missile gap.” He states that
“both gaps were figments in the

https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol62/iss4/16

167

imagination of the U.S. intelligence
community, based in the main on overstating the Soviet potential in order to
procure greater funds for military development.” While this is a standard
critique, Goodman applies what he
terms “counterfactual history,” a third
look into the mirror behind the mirror.
Counterfactual history, he argues, “is a
tool that often can be used to great effect. The Soviet Union, it seems, would
never have seriously contemplated war
with the West. Given the American
atomic arsenal, it is also unlikely that
even if Britain had not developed a nuclear deterrent, the Soviet Union would
ever have dared risk war.” Goodman
then measures the capabilities-tointentions calculus so familiar to students of the Naval War College, as follows: “In the minds of those who
mattered, Soviet capabilities were intimately linked to Soviet intentions.
Therefore, while the Soviets were without the capability to wage war, their intentions were perceived to be far less
aggressive.”
Goodman has produced a definitive
work, in that it validates the United
Kingdom’s unequivocal commitment to
an independent nuclear deterrent, and
by doing so he has given us a seminal
work, a landmark effort in its devotion
to prodigious research and commitment to truthful inquiry.
MYRON GREENBERG
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